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Supreme Court No. 97679-1
(COA No. 50826-5-II)

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JOSE MORENO-HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON FOR PIERCE COUNTY

PETITION FOR REVIEW

KATE L. BENWARD
Attorney for Appellant

WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT
1511 Third Avenue, Suite 610
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 587-2711

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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Jose Moreno-Hernandez, petitioner here and appellant below, asks this Court to accept review under RAP 13.4(b)(1)-(4) of the Court of Appeals decision terminating review dated July 9, 2019, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A. His motion to reconsider was denied on August 19, 2019, attached as A.

B. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Two Court of Appeals justices refused to find the prosecutor committed misconduct when he interjected his own memory and interpretation of a witness's Spanish language testimony in cross-examination and in closing argument, insisting the witness used a word conveying a sexual connotation in Spanish, despite the interpreter unambiguously clarifying that the sexual connotation in English was a mistranslation. Slip op. at 7. A third justice found the prosecutor committed misconduct, but that it was harmless. Slip. op. at 25. The Court also found the prosecutor's vouching for its witness in closing argument was waived because there was no objection; however, this misconduct was flagrant and ill intentioned, especially when considered in light of the other flagrant misconduct. The Court of Appeals also refused to consider the court's erroneous admission of hearsay evidence based on a patent

mischaracterization of the hearsay objection preserved below and raised on appeal. Slip op. 14.

C. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Was it misconduct for the prosecutor to interject his own memory and interpretation of a witness's prior foreign language testimony in cross-examination and in closing argument, even after the interpreter corrected the mistranslation? Was this not harmless error where the prosecutor erroneously insisted on a sexual connotation not intended by the witness in an attempted rape trial? RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), (3) and (4).

2. Did the prosecutor commit additional misconduct by arguing in closing that the complaining witness testified "very honestly? RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), (3) and (4)?

3. Did the prosecutor's introduction of the statements Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's accuser made *after* she reported to police that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez attempted to rape her violate the rule against hearsay? RAP 13.4(b)(1)(2) and (4)?

D. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. R.Y.'s separation from her mother and hatred for Mr. Moreno-Hernandez.

R.Y.'s mother, Nelbis Moreno, left her native El Salvador to work in the United States when R.Y. was five years old. RP 709-10; 1229. R.Y.

remained in El Salvador with her grandmother. RP 1230. Ms. Moreno sent money home to support R.Y. and the rest of her family. RP 710; 1230.

R.Y. felt hurt, angry, and sad that her mother left her. RP 899.

In the United States, Ms. Moreno married Mr. Moreno-Hernandez. RP 1229-30. R.Y. felt like her mother loved Mr. Moreno-Hernandez more than her. RP 903. R.Y.'s grandmother, who raised her in El Salvador, said that R.Y. did not like that her mother had a partner in the United States—she wanted her mother to herself. RP 1441-42. R.Y. told her grandmother that she wanted to destroy her mother's marriage. RP 1441.

At age 13, R.Y. became pregnant and wanted to leave El Salvador to escape her boyfriend's abuse. RP 923; 928. Ms. Moreno took out a loan to pay for her daughter's transport. RP 961, 1233. R.Y. arrived in August and was immediately enrolled in school. RP 734. Her daughter was born three months later. RP 734.

R.Y. disliked Mr. Moreno-Hernandez from the moment she arrived in the United States. RP 930. R.Y. fought constantly with him about doing the chores, which she did not believe she should be forced to take part in. RP 737, 945-46, 953, 961.

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez babysat R.Y.'s baby while Ms. Moreno was at work and R.Y. was at school, along with a neighbor's child. RP 950. R.Y. did not think that this was real work. RP 950. And although

R.Y. knew that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez had a back injury that prevented him from working outside the home, she still despised him for only being able to babysit. RP 895; 901.

Ms. Moreno worked two fast food jobs. RP 1238-39. She paid for R.Y.'s cell phone and clothes, but R.Y. believed her mother only bought things only for herself or Mr. Moreno-Hernandez. RP 956, 1358. She accused her mother of being too "lazy" to pay for childcare for her baby while R.Y. was at school. RP 955. R.Y. also perceived that her mother worked so much that she had no time for her. RP 733.

One night. R.Y. and Mr. Moreno-Hernandez had a huge fight about her mother's request for help with babysitting a neighbor child. RP 975-76, 1247-48. R.Y. refused, claiming that her own child was sick. RP 975-76. R.Y. went into her room. RP 975. R.Y. stated that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez came into her room and demanded she help. RP 975. R.Y. claimed Mr. Moreno-Hernandez was so mad at her she thought he was going to hit her. 976. But R.Y. was not afraid of him. RP 976. R.Y. told Mr. Moreno-Hernandez that she would call the police if he bothered her again. RP 1248.

2. R.Y.'s differing accounts of attempted rape.

While Ms. Moreno was at work the next day, R.Y. called police, reporting that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez had attempted to forcibly rape her.

RP 772. R.Y. was alone in the apartment with her baby when two officers arrived. RP 1168, 1221. One officer noted that R.Y. was visibly upset, but also “mostly subdued” and willing to talk. RP 1170. She had no physical marks on her and there was no sign of struggle in the home. RP 1182-83.

In the brief interview conducted with R.Y. through the interpreter that night, R.Y. claimed that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez pulled her into the bedroom while he was completely nude and attacked her. RP 1194; 1199-1200. R.Y. told police Mr. Moreno-Hernandez told her that he would assault her if she called police, and that he was going to rape her no matter what. RP 1200.

By contrast, at trial, R.Y. testified that she was laying in her bed when Mr. Moreno-Hernandez entered her bedroom fully clothed. RP 979. She said he grabbed her by her left arm, pulled her off her bed, and threw her onto the floor. RP 995-98. She said pulled down his pants and threw himself on top of her. RP 999. She claimed that he tried to spread her legs open with his legs and pulled down her pants, but not her underpants. RP 757. She said he grabbed his penis and tried to “put it in mine.” RP 759-61. She said she defended herself by kicking and yelling at him. RP 760. When she told him she would call the police, she said he got up and hurried out of the room. RP 770-71. Contrary to her first statement to

police, at trial, R.Y. said that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez said nothing to her when she told him she was calling the police. RP 771.

3. The prosecutor interjects his own interpretation and memory of incorrectly translated Spanish language testimony, even after the interpreter corrected the mistranslation.

At trial, Ms. Moreno testified that the night R.Y. called police, her sister called her at work and told her that that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez was pestering or annoying R.Y. RP 1269. This description was mistranslated to the jury as “molesting.” RP 1261. The interpreter later told the jury about the mistake, but the prosecutor continued to extensively question Ms. Moreno about the translation from the previous day, based on his own recollection of how the interpreter translated his questions to her. RP 1270-73. The prosecutor even insisted on the corrected mistranslation in closing argument, making it seem as though Ms. Moreno was told about R.Y.’s claim to police yet did nothing, which was not true. 1268-73; 1510.

None of R.Y.’s family, including her mother, aunt, and uncle believed R.Y. RP 1503. R.Y.’s mother thought R.Y. made it up and urged her daughter to tell the truth. RP 841. R.Y. testified in detail about the out-of-court statements she claimed her mother and aunt made to her after she reported the attempted tape, asserting they threatened her and urged her to withdraw her allegations, even though these statements had no bearing on a controverted issue. RP 840-41, 882-83.

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez was convicted of attempted rape in the second degree. CP 157; 123. With an offender score of zero, he was sentenced to serve 60 months to life imprisonment. CP 158, 161-62.

E. ARGUMENT

1. This Court should accept review to determine whether the prosecutor committed misconduct when he willfully interjected his own memory and understanding of foreign language testimony that contradicted the interpreter's translation. RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), (3) and (4).

- a. Prosecutorial misconduct deprives the accused of due process.

The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV. "Every prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer of the court, charged with the duty of insuring that an accused receives a fair trial." *State v. Boehning*, 127 Wn. App. 511, 518, 111 P.3d 899 (2005). Accordingly, "[p]rosecutorial misconduct may deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial." *In re Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d 696, 703-04, 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

- b. After the interpreter corrected Ms. Moreno's mistranslated testimony that improperly conveyed a sexual connotation, the prosecutor continued to insist on the prejudicial mistranslation.

During direct-examination of Ms. Moreno, the prosecutor questioned her extensively about her actions the evening that R.Y. called the police, asking her about the phone call she received that night from R.Y.'s aunt. Her answer was translated to the jury as follows:

Q. But did Patricia call you by phone?

A. Yes, by phone.

Q. And what did she indicate [R.Y.] had said?

A. My husband has been molesting her.

RP 1251. The prosecutor emphasized the sexual connotation of word "molest" when asking her, repeatedly on direct, over defense objection, about her actions after she heard Mr. Moreno-Hernandez "molested" R.Y.

RP 1253.

After the jury was excused, the interpreter informed the court that the word, "molest" in Ms. Moreno's testimony was mistranslated. RP

1260. The interpreter advised the court that the Spanish word, "*molestar*" was mistranslated into English with the sexual word, "molesting." The

word should have been translated into English as "bothering or

mistreating" R.Y. RP 1260. The jury was informed about the

mistranslation the next day. RP 1268.

Immediately after this correction, the prosecutor continued to assert the mistranslation of “molestar,” asking Ms. Moreno:

Q. And at some point during that conversation with your sister, you understood that the accusation that your daughter was making was that your husband had sexually molested her that evening, correct?

A. No. I didn't think that because she had never told me that he had annoyed her in that manner.

RP 1270. The prosecutor then testified about his recollection of the Spanish language interpretation as if it were evidence:

Q. Yesterday when I asked this question, you told us -- you told the interpreter that you were -- your sister called and told you that your husband -- that [R.Y] had said that Jose was bothering or annoying her, correct?

A. Yes. Just annoying, bothering, pestering. That's it.

Q. And you used the verb “*molestar*.”

MR. CUMMINGS: For the record that's M-O-L-E-S-T-A-R.

Q. Correct?

A. Yes. That's so.

Q. When we asked that question, we had this same set up, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So there was one interpreter interpreting my questions and another interpreter interpreting your answers, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And so the interpreter at the time who was interpreting your answers, you used the word “*molestar*,” correct?

A. Yes. That's so.

Q. But then I asked the question, “You were aware” -- or something to the effect that you knew that your daughter was saying that Jose had molested your daughter, correct?

A. I was not conscious of this because she had not said anything to me, as I will repeat again.

Q. So -- but isn't it correct that the interpreter who was interpreting questions for me did not use the word '*molestar*'? She used '*abuso dehonesto*'--

MR. CUMMINGS: Which for the record is A-B-U-S-O, '*abuso,*' and '*deshonesto*' is D-E-S-H-O-N-E-S-T-O.

RP 1270-71. The defense vigorously objected to this line of questioning without testimony from the interpreter. RP 1271-72. The court allowed the prosecutor to continue to ask questions about the translation of his questions, and the prosecutor then repeatedly asked Ms. Moreno about the Spanish translations from the previous day as if they were evidence. RP 1272-73; 1277.

The prosecutor then *again* returned to questioning Ms. Moreno about his recollection of the Spanish language that was translated to her the previous day in to infer that Ms. Moreno was informed that her daughter was sexually abused that night:

My question is, when you say that Ruben used the word *molestar*, is it your understanding Ruben observed the report that [R.Y.] made to the police?

A. Yes. That's so.

Q. If we're talking about someone taking down the pants of a 14-year-old girl and forcibly rubbing their penis between their leg, would you call that *molestar*, M-O-L-E-S-T-A-R?

A. I didn't know anything about that.

Q. That's not my question; is it? My question is, that situation I described, where someone forcibly removes the pants of a 14-year-old girl and rubs their penis between her legs, would you use the word *molestar*, M-O-L-E-S-T-A-R, to describe that action?

A. No. It's different.

Q. Right. That's *abuso deshonesto* -- A-B-U-S-O D-E-S-H-O-N-E-S-T-O – isn't it?

RP 1286-87. The court overruled the defense's continued objection to the prosecutor testifying about the Spanish language. RP 1287-88; 1304-05, 1311.

After this extensive questioning about the meaning of the Spanish translated words, the prosecutor again inserted the incorrect translation of *molestar* in closing argument, even though it had clearly been corrected by the interpreter:

Meanwhile, across town, Nelbis Moreno-Hernandez had learned that something -- her daughter had alleged that the defendant had molested her, and she did nothing.

RP 1510.

c. The prosecutor's insistence on his own memory and interpretation that contradicted the interpreter's corrected translation was misconduct.

i. The prosecutor's conduct violated the witness advocate rule.

The prosecutor is not a witness and should not be permitted to add to the record "either by subtle or gross improprieties." *Donnelly v. DeChristoforo*, 416 U.S. 637, 650-51, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1974). The advocate witness rule prohibits an attorney from appearing as both a witness and an advocate in the same litigation. *State v. Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d 423, 437, 326 P.3d 125 (2014). The witness advocate witness rule

“eliminates the risk that a testifying prosecutor will not be a fully objective witness given his [or her] position as an advocate for the government.” “eliminates the risk that a testifying prosecutor will not be a fully objective witness given his position as an advocate for the government.” *United States v. Prantil*, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985). Further, the rule prevents the prestige and prominence of the prosecutor’s office from being attributed to testimony by a testifying prosecutor. *Id.*

The prosecutor acted as witness when he paraphrased the testimony of R.Y to Ms. Moreno—twice describing in detail the act of “someone forcibly remov[ing] the pants of a 14-year-old girl and rubs their penis between her legs” and then told Ms. Moreno the meaning of this conduct in Spanish: “that’s abuso deshonesto—A-B-U-S-O D-E-S-H-O-N-E-S-T-O—isn’t it?” RP 1287. He also impermissibly testified about how his questions were translated to Ms. Moreno the previous day: “[I]sn’t it correct that the interpreter who was interpreting questions for me did not use the word ‘molestar’? She used ‘abuso deshonesto.’” RP 1271

The prosecutor’s repeated paraphrasing of R.Y.’s allegation and the translation of Spanish words was doubly improper, because he not only repeated R.Y.’s testimony through phrasing her allegation as a statement Ms. Moreno was required to adopt, but also put forth testimony

about the meaning of the Spanish language, without any evidence that the prosecutor in fact had knowledge of which he spoke. This was an improper melding of the prosecutor as witness and advocate. *See Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d at 437. The majority Court of Appeals opinion found that “probably better approaches existed for the prosecutor to determine whether Moreno understood the questions,” but refused to find this was misconduct. Slip op. at 9.

ii. The prosecutor’s questioning and closing introduced extrinsic evidence.

It is misconduct for a prosecutor to submit extrinsic evidence to a jury. *State v. Vassar*, 188 Wn. App. 251, 259, 352 P.3d 856 (2015); *State v. Jones*, 144 Wn. App. 284, 298, 183 P.3d 307 (2008) (Prosecutors have an ethical duty to ensure a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence). Prosecutors are not permitted to make prejudicial statements unsupported by the record. *Jones*, 144 Wn. App. at 293; *see also State v. Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d 559, 577, 79 P.3d 432 (2003) (statements not sustained by the record are improper). Here the prosecutor instead relied on his memory and personal knowledge of the spelling and meaning of the Spanish language words, “molestar” and “abuso deshonesto.” RP 1271; 1273. The prosecutor’s translations were therefore extrinsic evidence, or

“information that is outside all the evidence admitted at trial.” *Vassar*, 188 Wn. App. at 259.

The Court of Appeals failed to properly consider this error, finding that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez relied on cases in which the prosecutor impermissibly introduced extrinsic evidence in closing rather than in the case-in-chief as occurred here. Slip op. at 10. Even if this distinction were legally significant, the prosecutor did flagrantly use of the mistranslation in closing argument. RP 1510; see also Appendix B, p. 5 (Motion to Reconsider).

iii. The prosecutor usurped the interpreter’s role as an expert.

The prosecutor usurped the role of the expert interpreter by his questioning of Ms. Moreno about the Spanish language translation.

An interpreter who interprets a testifying witnesses’ testimony must be qualified as an expert. ER 604. And an interpreter may testify as an expert if specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. *United States v. Taren-Palma*, 997 F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1993); ER 702. “Cross-examination that attempts to impeach by slipping in unrelayed opinions and conclusions without calling the experts to testify is improper.” *State v. Hamilton*, 196 Wn. App. 461, 464, 383 P.3d 1062 (2016).

Without being qualified as an expert in the Spanish language, the prosecutor relied on his own memory and unverified language skills to question Ms. Moreno about whether a word was translated to her as “abuso deshonesto” and not “molestar.” RP 1271-73. He then had her affirm that the sexual misconduct he paraphrased from R.Y.’s testimony would be translated as “abuso deshonesto.” RP 1287.

iv. The prosecutor belittled the witness’s use of her own language and may have improperly appealed to ethnic bias.

As found by the concurring justice, the prosecutor’s questioning of Ms. Moreno also inappropriately belittled her use and knowledge of the Spanish language, and may have improperly appealed to the juror’s racial or ethnic bias by emphasizing her ethnicity through a focus on the language she speaks. *See State v. Monday*, 171 Wn.2d 667, 678, 257 P.3d 551 (2011); slip. op. at 24 (concurring opinion) (“the prosecutor’s extended and unusual exchange with this witness could have appealed to the jury’s unconscious bias.”).

d. The prosecutor also impermissibly vouched for the complaining witness.

A prosecutor’s comment which expresses a personal opinion of witness veracity is improper. *State v. Stith*, 71 Wn. App. 14, 19, 856 P.2d 415 (1993).

Here there was no corroboration of R.Y.'s testimony, other than the prosecution's repetition of it. The prosecutor tried to credit R.Y.'s story by deliberately eliciting inadmissible hearsay evidence from R.Y.'s foster mother, the defense objected to and the court sustained. RP 1145.

In response, the prosecutor noted, in front of the jury:

MR. CUMMINGS: Just to make my record, Your Honor, it's a consistent statement regarding -- and goes directly to her credibility. She has been consistent to every person she's spoken to, and this merely explains and exemplifies that.

RP 1145 (emphasis added). Though the court admonished the prosecutor off the record for this inappropriate speaking objection, the jury nevertheless heard the prosecutor's opinion that R.Y. had been consistent throughout, including in evidence that was not presented at trial. RP 1147-48. In addition, the prosecutor framed his questioning over defense objection to show that he did not believe the inconsistencies in R.Y.'s testimony were important by asking, "you probably did not tell them exactly the same words that you used here today; is that right?" RP 774.

In closing, the prosecutor impermissibly told the jury that R.Y. was being honest about her allegation:

She explained to you very honestly about how that occurred, that she didn't expect it, and her focus at that moment was defending herself.

RP 1508. Whether R.Y. “honestly” described events was a question for the jury to decide, and was it improper for the prosecutor state his opinion about her veracity in closing. *Stith*, 71 Wn. App. at 19.

e. The misconduct was prejudicial, flagrant, and ill intentioned.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the objected to misconduct of the prosecution’s questioning and argument about the Spanish language was not error and even if were error, and to the extent that it was error, it was not prejudicial. Slip op. at 11 (majority opinion); 25 (concurring opinion). The Court of Appeals found that without an objection, the prosecutor’s opinion R.Y. testified “honestly” was waived and could have been corrected by a jury instruction. Slip op. at 13.

A prosecutor’s improper conduct that prejudices the accused requires reversal. *Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d at 444. Consideration of any material by a jury not properly admitted as evidence vitiates a verdict when there is a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant may have been prejudiced. *Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d at 705. Prejudice is established if there is a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor’s statements affected the jury’s verdict. *Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d at 440 (citing *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012)).

The prosecutor’s impermissible assertion of the meaning of Spanish word *molestar* served to corroborate R.Y.’s allegation through

sheer repetition and insinuation that Ms. Moreno was told about a sexual assault that night, when in fact the interpreter clarified those were not Ms. Moreno's words. RP 1268. This was objected to and certainly prejudiced Mr. Moreno-Hernandez because his conviction rested on R.Y.'s testimony alone. It becomes more prejudicial when the prosecutor insisted on using the improper interpretation in closing to discredit Ms. Moreno, and credit R.Y. RP 1510. The prosecutor's insistence on the sexual connotation of the English word "molested" when that was not part of the record was a flagrant disregard of the correction made by the interpreter and constitutes clear and intentional misconduct. RP 1268.

Where there is no objection at trial, as for the opinion of R.Y.'s veracity in this case, reversal is required if the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice. *Glassman*, 175 Wn.2d at 704. And cumulative error may warrant reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, even if each error standing alone would otherwise be considered harmless. *State v. Weber*, 159 Wn.2d 252, 279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006). Here the prosecutor's personal vouching encouraged the jury to overlook the myriad inconsistencies of R.Y.'s statements surrounding the allegation through improper conduct. The cumulative effect of this misconduct prejudiced Mr. Moreno-Hernandez and requires a new trial. *Jones*, 144 Wn. App. at 301.

2. This Court should grant review of a clearly preserved objection to inadmissible hearsay testimony that was admitted over defense objection on the basis of the effect on the listener; however, this was not a valid basis where R.Y.'s state of mind at that time was not a controverted issue. RAP 13.(4)(b)(2) and (4).

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez moved to prohibit R.Y. from testifying about her mother's and aunt's hearsay statements in which they expressed nonsupport for her allegations against Mr. Moreno-Hernandez. RP 840-41. The court overruled Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's motion based on the prosecution's claimed use, which was "effect on the listener." RP 840, 852. This was an improper basis for admission of these hearsay statements where R.Y.'s state of mind after the allegation was not a controverted issue.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted." ER 801(c). A statement is not hearsay if it shows the effect on the listener, without regard to the truth of the statement. *State v. Edwards*, 131 Wn. App. 611, 614, 128 P.3d 631 (2006). Out-of-court declarations must be relevant to an issue in controversy to be admissible on this basis. *Edwards*, 131 Wn. App. at 614. In *Edwards*, the court admitted the statements of an informant on the State's theory that these statements caused the detective to begin his investigation. *Edwards*, 131

Wn. App. at 614. The *Edwards* court deemed this inadmissible hearsay since the detective's motive for starting his investigation "was not an issue in controversy" and therefore not relevant. *Id.* at 614.

Here R.Y. was permitted to testify about text messages she received from her Aunt Patricia, as argued by the prosecutor, on the grounds that they go to "her credibility and the effect on the listener." RP 852. R.Y. testified that she received text messages from her aunt in which her aunt asked her to "lie" so she could go back with her mother, or say "what I alleged happened had not happened." RP 883.

But R.Y.'s state of mind after reporting her allegations was not at issue. There was no recantation, only changing testimony about the details as she talked to more interviewers. Like in *Edwards*, where the hearsay statements were not relevant to a controverted issue, here R.Y.'s state of mind after the allegation were similarly irrelevant. *Edwards*, 131 Wn. App. at 615. The Court of Appeals entirely misconstrued this argument, mistaking Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's hearsay argument and the importance determining relevance for the basis of the hearsay being admitted. Slip op. at 14.

F. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, petitioner Mr. Moreno-Hernandez respectfully requests this that review be granted pursuant to RAP 13.4 (b).

DATED this 18th day of September, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Kate Benward
Washington State Bar Number 43651
Washington Appellate Project
1511 Third Ave, Suite 610
Seattle, WA 98101
Telephone: (206) 587-2711
Fax: (206) 587-2710
Kate.benward@gmail.com

APPENDIX A

July 9, 2019

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JOSE R. MORENO-HERNANDEZ,

Appellant.

No. 50826-5-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MELNICK, J. — Jose Moreno-Hernandez appeals his conviction for attempted rape in the second degree. He first argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct on numerous instances, which violated his right to a fair trial. Second, Moreno-Hernandez argues that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay statements. Finally, he argues that his judgment and sentence contains an unconstitutionally vague community custody condition ordering him to have “no contact” with minors and that it contains unauthorized legal financial obligations (LFOs).

We affirm the conviction but remand for the trial court to reconsider the imposition of LFOs.

FACTS

Nelbis Moreno gave birth to RY in El Salvador. When RY was five years old, Moreno left her in El Salvador and went to the United States. Moreno then married Moreno-Hernandez.

At 13 years of age, RY followed her mother to the United States and moved into an apartment with her and Moreno-Hernandez. At the time, RY was pregnant. She gave birth three months later.

One evening, RY called the police alleging that Moreno-Hernandez attempted to rape her. The police arrived and talked with RY. RY's uncle, Ruben Arevalo, and cousin also arrived and helped interpret RY's statement for the police. Arevalo then transported RY to the care of Child Protective Services. Yanilda Dafe became RY's foster parent.

The State charged Moreno-Hernandez with attempted rape in the second degree and child molestation in the third degree.

I. TRIAL AND SENTENCING

The case proceeded to trial where the State argued Moreno-Hernandez committed attempted rape and RY's testimony had credibility. In support of its theory, the State argued that RY's allegation had turned her whole family against her, but they would have returned to her side if she recanted her story. Nonetheless, RY did not recant.

Moreno-Hernandez argued that RY had a motive to lie because she felt her mother abandoned her in El Salvador and, as a result, she resented Moreno-Hernandez. Numerous witnesses at trial, including RY and Moreno, required Spanish interpreters.

A. RY's Testimony

After RY described the attempted rape and how she had spoken with the police following the incident, the prosecutor asked her: "When you told the police officers what happened, did you tell them—you probably did not tell them exactly the same words that you used here today; is that right?" 4 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 774. Moreno-Hernandez objected to the question as leading. The court overruled the objection. RY responded that different interviewers asked her different questions, which explained some of the inconsistencies in her description of the incident.

RY testified that she did not see Moreno until the day after the incident. RY said that at that time, Moreno told her to "tell the truth." 5 RP at 838. The prosecutor then asked RY: "What,

if any, bad consequences did [Moreno] say would result if you didn't take back your report?" 5 RP at 840. Moreno-Hernandez objected on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection. RY answered that Moreno told her to tell the truth or Moreno would take RY's child away from her.

RY also testified that two days after the incident, her aunt texted her. The prosecutor asked RY: "did your [aunt] ever send you any text messages about what you should do regarding your report about what [Moreno-Hernandez] did to you?" 5 RP at 846. Moreno-Hernandez objected on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection. RY answered: "[My aunt] did send me a message. . . . [And] what I understood was that she was seeming to ask me to lie; that way I could go back to my mother. . . . [T]o say as if that what I alleged happened had not happened." 5 RP at 883.

B. Dafe's Testimony

During Dafe's testimony, the prosecutor asked: "Did [RY] ever give you details about what happened to her . . . ?" 7 RP at 1145. Dafe answered: "Yes, she did." 7 RP at 1145. The prosecutor then asked: "And what did she say happened?" 7 RP at 1145. Moreno-Hernandez objected, and the court sustained the objection. The prosecutor then said:

Just to make my record, Your Honor, it's a consistent statement regarding—and goes directly to [RY's] credibility. She has been consistent to every person she's spoken to, and this merely explains and exemplifies that.

7 RP at 1145.

C. Moreno's Testimony¹

Moreno testified that on the night of the incident, her sister called to tell her that RY had called. The prosecutor asked: "And what did [your sister] indicate [RY] had said?" 7 RP at 1251. Moreno responded: "[Moreno-Hernandez] has been molesting her." 7 RP at 1251. Moreno stated that because she had no way to get home, she continued working until the manager drove her home after her shift.

The following interaction then took place:

[Prosecutor:] So you got a call . . . that indicated [RY] said that [Moreno-Hernandez] had molested her; you didn't ask your manager for a ride home at that moment?

. . . .

[Moreno:] Yes. I asked for the ride, but there was no other employee working or another manager to take care of the store.

[Prosecutor:] So you're telling me that you told your manager, "My daughter just told me she's being molested," and he said, "I won't give you a ride home"?

[Moreno:] Well, to tell you the truth, I couldn't express myself like that because I don't speak English.

7 RP at 1253. Shortly thereafter, the court recessed for the day. After the court dismissed the jury, the interpreter informed the court that she had misinterpreted the word "molesting" from Moreno's testimony and that the appropriate interpretation was "bothering" or "mistreating." 7 RP at 1260.

The following morning, the interpreter explained the error to the jury. The State then examined Moreno as follows:

[Prosecutor:] . . . [W]hat exactly did your sister . . . say when she called you?

[Moreno:] Well, that [RY] had called my sister and that [Moreno-Hernandez] was pestering or annoying her.

[Prosecutor:] And at some point during that conversation with your sister, you understood that the accusation that [RY] was making was that [Moreno-Hernandez] had sexually molested her that evening, correct?

¹ Moreno testified in Spanish. The English translation is from the interpreter speaking in English at trial.

[Moreno:] No. I didn't think that because [my sister] had never told me that he had annoyed [RY] in that manner.

[Prosecutor:] Yesterday when I asked this question, you told us . . . your sister called and told you that . . . [RY] had said that [Moreno-Hernandez] was bothering or annoying her, correct?

[Moreno:] Yes. Just annoying, bothering, pestering. That's it.

. . . .

[Prosecutor:] When we asked that question, we had this same set up, correct?

[Moreno:] Yes.

[Prosecutor:] So there was one interpreter interpreting my questions and another interpreter interpreting your answers, correct?

[Moreno:] Yes.

[Prosecutor:] Okay. And . . . you used the word "*molestar*," correct?

[Moreno:] Yes. That's so.

[Prosecutor:] But then I asked the question, "You were aware"—or something to the effect that you knew that [RY] was saying that [Moreno-Hernandez] had molested [RY], correct?

[Moreno:] I was not conscious of this because [my sister] had not said anything to me, as I will repeat again.

[Prosecutor:] So—but isn't it correct that the interpreter who was interpreting questions for me did not use the word "*molestar*"?

8 RP at 1269-71. Moreno-Hernandez objected, arguing that "if we need to take testimony from the interpreter, [he was] going to need an opportunity to interview th[e] interpreter." 8 RP at 1271.

The court stated that it would address Moreno-Hernandez's issue later.

The prosecutor then continued:

[Prosecutor:] When I asked the followup question, I used the word—the word that was translated to you was *abuso deshonesto*, correct?

[Moreno:] My sister never said at any moment that he was being sexually inappropriate or that he had been naked or anything like that.

[Prosecutor:] That's not the question I just asked you; is it, [Moreno]? Is it?

[Moreno:] But it's the same thing. It's the same thing when you're talking about sexual inappropriateness. And if that's not how I should understand it, explain it to me.

[Prosecutor:] So I'm going to repeat my question.

My question is, when I asked the followup question yesterday, the verb that was translated from my question was not *molestar*. It was *abuso deshonesto*, correct?

[Moreno:] Well, I don't remember that you had—if you asked me that question.

[Prosecutor:] Okay. So you don't recall what you testified to yesterday afternoon?

....

[Moreno:] Of course I did.

8 RP at 1272-74.

Moreno then testified about her conversation with her brother, Arevalo, the morning after the incident. The following interaction took place:

[Moreno:] [Arevalo] said that . . . [Moreno-Hernandez] had been bothering, annoying, or pestering [RY].

[Prosecutor:] You used that verb *molestar* again just now.

[Moreno:] Yes. Because they didn't give me any explanation concerning what it was about.

[Prosecutor:] Okay. So [Arevalo], when he spoke to you, only told you—only used the verb *molestar* to describe what [RY] had said about what [Moreno-Hernandez] had done to her.

[Moreno:] Yes. That's so.

[Prosecutor:] Just like you're saying that [your sister] only used the word *molestar*, correct?

[Moreno:] Yes.

[Prosecutor:] And was it your understanding that [Arevalo] was there when [RY] made the report to the police officers?

[Moreno:] Well, he told me that, when he arrived, the police was already there.

[Prosecutor:] Sure. My question is, when you say that [Arevalo] used the word *molestar*, is it your understanding [Arevalo] observed the report that [RY] made to the police?

[Moreno:] Yes. That's so.

[Prosecutor:] If we're talking about someone taking down the pants of a 14-year-old girl and forcibly rubbing their penis between their leg, would you call that *molestar* . . . ?

[Moreno:] I didn't know anything about that.

[Prosecutor:] That's not my question; is it?

My question is, that situation I described, where someone forcibly removes the pants of a 14-year-old girl and rubs their penis between her legs, would you use the word *molestar* . . . to describe that action?

[Moreno:] No. It's different.

[Prosecutor:] Right. That's *abuso deshonesto* . . . isn't it?

8 RP at 1286-87. Moreno-Hernandez objected to “the use of Spanish in an English-speaking courtroom.” 8 RP at 1287. The court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then pursued a

different line of questioning, and Moreno never answered the question. During a later colloquy, the court told Moreno-Hernandez that it would permit him to call an interpreter as a witness to clarify the meaning of the Spanish words used or for any additional clarification.

D. Closing Argument

At one point in its closing argument, the State discussed the details of the attempted rape. It then stated to the jury that RY “explained to you very honestly about how [the attempted rape] occurred.” 9 RP at 1508.

E. Conviction and Sentencing

The jury found Moreno-Hernandez guilty of both counts. The child molestation conviction merged into the attempted rape in the second degree conviction.

The court sentenced Moreno-Hernandez to 60 months to life imprisonment. The court found Moreno-Hernandez indigent. It imposed LFOs, including a criminal filing fee. In addition, the court ordered that interest accrue on the financial obligations until paid in full. As a condition of Moreno-Hernandez’s sentence, the court ordered that he have no contact with minors. Moreno-Hernandez appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Moreno-Hernandez argues that numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct plagued his trial and violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles

“Prosecutorial misconduct may deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.” *In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d 696, 703-04, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must “show that in the context of the record

and all of the circumstances of the trial, the prosecutor's conduct was both improper and prejudicial." *Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d at 704.

“Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” *State v. Thorgerson*, 172 Wn.2d 438, 460, 258 P.3d 43 (2011) (quoting *State v. Brett*, 126 Wn.2d 136, 174-75, 892 P.2d 29 (1995)). We review the prosecutor's conduct and whether prejudice resulted therefrom “by examining that conduct in the full trial context, including the evidence presented, ‘the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given to the jury.’” *State v. Monday*, 171 Wn.2d 667, 675, 257 P.3d 551 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *State v. McKenzie*, 157 Wn.2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006)).

We review a prosecutor's comments during closing argument in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the jury instructions. *State v. Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d 559, 578, 79 P.3d 432 (2003). During closing argument, a prosecutor has “wide latitude in drawing and expressing reasonable inferences from the evidence.” *State v. Hoffman*, 116 Wn.2d 51, 94-95, 804 P.2d 577 (1991). But a prosecutor may not argue facts not in evidence or make arguments appealing to a jury's passion that prejudices the defendant. *State v. Belgarde*, 110 Wn.2d 504, 507-08, 755 P.2d 174 (1988); *State v. Boehning*, 127 Wn. App. 511, 519, 111 P.3d 899 (2005).

In a prosecutorial misconduct claim, a defendant who fails to object to improper conduct may be deemed to have waived the issue on appeal unless the prosecutor's statements are so flagrant and ill-intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not be corrected by a jury instruction. *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760-61, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). The defendant must show that (1) no curative instruction would have eliminated the prejudicial effect, and (2) the misconduct

resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the verdict. *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 761. The focus of this inquiry is more on whether the resulting prejudice could have been cured, rather than the flagrant or ill-intentioned nature of the remarks. *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 762.

B. Acted as Advocate-Witness

Moreno-Hernandez argues that the prosecutor violated the advocate-witness rule when he paraphrased the testimony of RY and when he discussed how his questions had been interpreted. We disagree.²

An attorney cannot appear both as a witness and as an advocate in the same litigation. *State v. Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d 423, 437, 326 P.3d 125 (2014).

We conclude that the prosecutor here did not act as an advocate-witness. The record shows that, after the interpreter corrected the error, an unusual exchange followed. The prosecutor wanted to inquire as to whether the interpreter had in fact made a misinterpretation; therefore, he questioned whether Moreno learned of sexual abuse on the night of the incident and still defended Moreno-Hernandez. Consequently, the prosecutor asked questions designed to reveal when Moreno learned that the alleged abuse was sexual in nature. He sought clarification on whether Moreno had understood his question before the misinterpretation and whether she had understood his follow-up questions following the misinterpretation. Although other and probably better approaches existed for the prosecutor to determine whether Moreno understood his questions, the prosecutor's line of questioning did not violate the advocate-witness rule.

² We also reject the State's argument that Moreno-Hernandez did not preserve this issue for appeal. Additionally, Moreno-Hernandez preserved his arguments that the prosecutor introduced extrinsic evidence and usurped the role of interpreter as an expert.

C. Introduced Extrinsic Evidence

Moreno-Hernandez argues that the prosecutor never obtained the record of proceedings and relied on his memory and personal knowledge of the meaning of the Spanish words. As a result, Moreno-Hernandez argues that the prosecutor erred by introducing extrinsic evidence. We disagree.

“It is misconduct for a prosecutor to submit extrinsic evidence to a jury.” *State v. Vassar*, 188 Wn. App. 251, 259, 352 P.3d 856 (2015). Extrinsic evidence is information outside what is presented at trial. *Vassar*, 188 Wn. App. at 259.

We conclude that the prosecutor did not improperly submit extrinsic evidence. Moreno-Hernandez bases his argument on cases where prosecutors argued, *in closing*, evidence outside the record. Here, the challenged conduct occurred during the State’s case-in-chief.

After the interpreter informed the court and the jury of the error, the prosecutor asked Moreno whether she had understood his initial question and his follow-up questions from the previous day. In formulating follow-up questions, the prosecutor reflected on his memory of Moreno’s testimony and his memory of the Spanish words used to interpret his questions and her responses. Although the prosecutor could have taken a different approach, we conclude that the prosecutor did not submit extrinsic evidence to the jury in his exchange with Moreno.

D. Usurped Role of Expert

Moreno-Hernandez argues that “[t]he prosecutor usurped the role of the expert interpreter by his questioning of [Moreno] about the Spanish language translation.” Br. of Appellant at 23. According to Moreno-Hernandez, the prosecutor then used his interpretation to improperly impeach Moreno. If any error occurred, it was harmless.

Evidence, even if otherwise relevant, without adequate foundation is not relevant because it is not useful in making material facts more or less likely. *See* 5A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 611.5, at 532 (6th ed. 2016); *see also State v. Swan*, 114 Wn.2d 613, 659, 790 P.2d 610 (1990). Where the subject matter of testimony is beyond the common knowledge and understanding of the average person, expert testimony is appropriate to assist the jury. ER 702; *State v. Ciskie*, 110 Wn.2d 263, 274, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988).

After the misinterpretation and subsequent correction by the interpreter, a fairly unique exchange occurred between the prosecutor and witness. After being informed of the misinterpretation, the prosecutor asked Moreno whether she had understood his initial and follow-up questions. In asking the questions, the prosecutor relied on his memory regarding his examination of Moreno the previous day.

Although it probably would have been better to call the interpreter as a witness as to what she did, we cannot say the prosecutor erred in his examination of Moreno.

However, even if this line of questioning usurped the role of the interpreter, any error was harmless. Moreno vehemently denied the prosecutor's insinuations that she learned of the sexual nature of the abuse the night of the incident while at work. In response to each of the prosecutor's questions, Moreno stated that she did not learn the abuse was sexual in nature the night of the incident. Thus, if any clarity resulted from the prosecutor's line of questioning, it was the fact that Moreno did not learn that the abuse was sexual in nature on the night of the incident. Furthermore, the court stated to Moreno-Hernandez that it would permit him to call an interpreter as a witness to clarify the meaning of the Spanish words used or for any additional clarification. Moreno-Hernandez decided not to call an interpreter. Accordingly, if error occurred, it was harmless.

E. Referred to Out-of-Court Statements

Moreno-Hernandez argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for RY's reliability when he referred to inadmissible, out-of-court statements she made that were consistent with her in-court testimony. We conclude that the statement in response to the court's ruling was error, but because Moreno-Hernandez did not object to the statement, we also conclude that he waived the issue.

Moreno-Hernandez objected to the State's proposed question about whether RY had told Dafe about Moreno-Hernandez's abuse. After the court ruled that the question called for hearsay, the State then said:

Just to make my record, Your Honor, it's a consistent statement regarding—and goes directly to [RY's] credibility. She has been consistent to every person she's spoken to, and this merely explains and exemplifies that.

7 RP at 1145. The State concedes the prosecutor's comment was improper. However, Moreno-Hernandez did not object. Therefore, to prevail in his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Moreno-Hernandez must show that the prosecutor's statements were so flagrant and ill-intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not be corrected by a jury instruction. *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 760-61.

We conclude that any prejudice could have been cured by an instruction. The court could have instructed the jury to disregard the comment and only rely on the testimony admitted by the court. The State's comment was not highly inflammatory such that it could not have been cured by an instruction, and thus, we conclude that Moreno-Hernandez waived the issue on appeal.

F. Commented on RY's Reliability

Moreno-Hernandez argues that the prosecutor improperly commented on RY's reliability at two other points during trial. We disagree.

It is improper for a prosecutor to state a personal belief as to the credibility of a witness. *Brett*, 126 Wn.2d at 175. A statement is prejudicial only if it is a “clear and unmistakable” expression of a personal opinion. *Brett*, 126 Wn.2d at 175 (quoting *State v. Sargent*, 40 Wn. App. 340, 344, 698 P.2d 598 (1985)). A prosecutor enjoys wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence concerning witness credibility. *State v. Warren*, 165 Wn.2d 17, 30, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).

Moreno-Hernandez first argues that the prosecutor made an impermissible comment on RY’s reliability when he asked her: “you probably did not tell them exactly the same words that you used here today; is that right?” Br. of Appellant at 28 (quoting 4 RP at 774). We disagree.

The prosecutor’s question implied that RY made prior inconsistent statements regarding the specific details of the attempted rape. This question was not a clear and unmistakable expression of his personal opinion regarding RY’s credibility or reliability. Therefore, even if the question was improper, it was not prejudicial.

Furthermore, the use of leading questions with child witnesses is within the discretion of the trial court. *State v. Allen*, 70 Wn.2d 690, 692, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967); *State v. Canida*, 4 Wn. App. 275, 279, 480 P.2d 800 (1971). We conclude that the prosecutor’s question to RY did not constitute misconduct.

Moreno-Hernandez next argues that the prosecutor made an impermissible comment on RY’s reliability when he told the jury in his closing argument that she had testified “very honestly.” Br. of Appellant at 28 (quoting 9 RP at 1508). We disagree.

Moreno-Hernandez failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment in closing, and thus he waived the issue. The comment was not so flagrant and ill-intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not have been corrected by a jury instruction.

G. Cumulative Error

Moreno-Hernandez argues that the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct constituted cumulative error and that the cumulative error prejudiced him. We disagree.

“Cumulative error may warrant reversal, even if each error standing alone would otherwise be considered harmless.” *State v. Weber*, 159 Wn.2d 252, 279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006). Without error, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. *State v. Clark*, 187 Wn.2d 641, 655, 389 P.3d 462 (2017). Cumulative error “does not apply where the errors are few and have little or no effect on the outcome of the trial.” *Weber*, 159 Wn.2d at 279.

Here, there was no cumulative error that requires reversal of the convictions.

II. HEARSAY

Moreno-Hernandez argues that “[t]he hearsay statements of R.Y.’s mother and aunt [were] . . . inadmissible because they [were] not relevant to an issue in controversy.” Br. of Appellant at 33. We disagree.

“A party may only assign error in the appellate court on the specific ground of the evidentiary objection made at trial.” *State v. Guloy*, 104 Wn.2d 412, 422, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985); *see* ER 103(a); RAP 2.5(a). At trial, Moreno-Hernandez argued that the statements were inadmissible because they were hearsay. On appeal, he argues that the statements were inadmissible because they were not relevant. Because Moreno-Hernandez is appealing on a different ground than his objection at trial, we conclude that his argument on appeal is not preserved.

III. COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITION

Moreno-Hernandez argues that the term “no contact” in his community custody condition, which prevents him from contacting minors, is unconstitutionally vague.³ We disagree.

We review sentencing conditions for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Sanchez Valencia*, 169 Wn.2d 782, 791-92, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010). Imposing an unconstitutional condition is always an abuse of discretion. *State v. Bahl*, 164 Wn.2d 739, 753, 193 P.3d 678 (2008).

The due process vagueness doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution requires that citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct. *Bahl*, 164 Wn.2d at 752. A community custody condition is unconstitutionally vague if either “(1) it does not sufficiently define the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can understand the prohibition or (2) it does not provide sufficiently ascertainable standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” *State v. Padilla*, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018).

In deciding whether a term is unconstitutionally vague, we do not consider the term in a vacuum, rather, we consider the term in the context in which it is used. *Bahl*, 164 Wn.2d at 754. “If ‘persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the [law] is sufficiently definite.’” *Bahl*, 164 Wn.2d at 754 (alterations in original) (quoting *City of Spokane v. Douglass*, 115 Wn.2d 171, 179, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)).

³ Although he claims that the condition is also not crime related, Moreno-Hernandez provides no argument on the subject. Therefore, we do not consider it. *State v. Thomas*, 150 Wn.2d 821, 868-69, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

Here, the term “no contact” is sufficiently definite. Numerous cases have upheld “no contact” community custody conditions. *E.g.*, *State v. Corbett*, 158 Wn. App. 576, 601, 242 P.3d 52 (2010).

Moreno-Hernandez’s reliance on *State v. Irwin*, 191 Wn. App. 644, 364 P.3d 830 (2015), is misplaced. In *Irwin*, the court addressed a community custody condition that prevented the defendant from “frequent[ing] areas where minor children are known to congregate, as defined by the supervising [community corrections officer].” 191 Wn. App. at 649 (second alteration in original). Washington courts have been inconsistent on whether the phrase “where minors congregate” is unconstitutionally vague. *See State v. Wallmuller*, 4 Wn. App. 2d 698, 704-13, 423 P.3d 282 (2018) (Lee, J., dissenting) (discussing cases), *review granted*, 192 Wn.2d 1009 (2019). The Washington Supreme Court recently granted review on the issue. No such inconsistency exists regarding “no contact.”

In fact, “no contact” conditions are specifically authorized by statute, RCW 9.94A.703(3)(b). We conclude that the community custody is not unconstitutionally vague because persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what no contact with minors proscribes.

IV. LFOs


Moreno-Hernandez argues that, due to the 2018 amendments to the LFO statutes, we should strike the \$200 criminal filing fee the trial court imposed on him.

The State agrees that we should strike the \$200 criminal filing fee. It also recognizes that we should strike the interest-accrual provision of Moreno-Hernandez’s judgment and sentence. We accept the State’s concessions.

We remand for the trial court to reconsider the imposition of LFOs. On remand, the trial court should consider all of the LFOs in light of the 2018 amendments to the LFO provisions, LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, and *State v. Ramirez*, 191 Wn.2d 732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018).

We otherwise affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.



Melnick, P.J.

I concur:



Sutton, J.

GLASGOW, J. (concurrency) — I agree with the majority that Jose Moreno-Hernandez’s conviction should be affirmed. I write separately because I am troubled by the prosecutor’s exchange with RY’s mother, Nelbis Moreno, regarding the interpreter’s mistranslation of her testimony. Rather than rely on the transcript of Moreno’s prior testimony and rather than call the interpreter to explain the correct interpretation of Moreno’s prior testimony, the prosecutor chose to question Moreno about the mistranslation, giving his own characterization of what Moreno had said and the meaning of Spanish words. In doing so, he repeated and repeatedly spelled “molestar.”

The exchange subtly, but unnecessarily, appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury in two ways. The interpreter explained that “molestar” means “bothering or annoying” rather than “molesting.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 1268. Still, the prosecutor’s repeated use and spelling of the word likely reinforced the sexual connotation that “molest” conveys to an English speaker. The unusual exchange with this witness also unnecessarily and explicitly emphasized her status as a non-English speaker while simultaneously questioning her understanding of words in her native language.

FACTS

The victim, RY, and her mother, Moreno, immigrated to the United States from El Salvador. Moreno came to this country first and left her daughter in El Salvador with relatives for several years. RY became pregnant when she was 13. Believing her daughter was not safe, Moreno arranged for RY to travel to this country. RY reunited with her mother here in Washington, where her mother had married the defendant.

This case involved allegations of one instance of sexual abuse that RY made against the defendant. There was no physical evidence and there were no witnesses. Moreno sided with the

defendant and did not believe RY's allegations. The defense theory was that RY's accusations stemmed from resentment against her stepfather whom she resented and disliked.

Moreno was at work at a fast food restaurant when her daughter called the police to report that Moreno-Hernandez had attempted to rape her. Apparently in an attempt to undermine Moreno's credibility and question her loyalty to her daughter, the prosecutor attacked Moreno's failure to leave work immediately to be with her. Moreno explained that she was not told at that time that the accusation was one of sexual assault. She also did not have transportation and could not get a ride home from work until the end of her shift. It was in this context that the mistranslation occurred.

During Moreno's testimony, one of the interpreters incorrectly interpreted her use of the Spanish word "molestar" to the English word "molest." 7 VRP at 1251, 1260-61. Subsequently, the prosecutor used the word "molest" in two questions to Moreno. 7 VRP at 1253. First, the prosecutor asked: "[Y]ou got a call at 7:00 p.m. that indicated your daughter said that the defendant had molested her; you didn't ask your manager for a ride home at that moment?" 7 VRP at 1253. The defense counsel objected but was overruled. The prosecutor repeated the question but omitted the word "molest." 7 VRP at 1253. Moreno did not have the opportunity to respond specifically to the prosecutor's use of the word "molest." 7 VRP at 1253.

The second time the prosecutor used the word "molest" was when he asked: "[Y]ou're telling me that you told your manager, 'My daughter just told me she's being molested,' and he said, 'I won't give you a ride home?'" 7 VRP at 1253. Moreno did not respond directly but instead explained that she "couldn't express [her]self like that because [she didn't] speak English." 7 VRP at 1253.

At the end of the day, outside of the presence of the jury, the interpreter explained to the judge and counsel that in Spanish, “molestar” means “to bother” or “annoy” and does not have the sexual connotation that “molest” has in English. 8 VRP at 1268. The interpreter had mistranslated the word.

The next morning, the interpreter concisely explained to the jury the misinterpretation. The interpreter told the jury that “I misinterpreted the word for ‘bothering’ or ‘unknowing’ as ‘molesting,’ which has a sexual connotation.” 8 VRP at 1268. The interpreter went on saying that “the [correct] word would be ‘bothering’ or ‘annoying.’” 8 VRP at 1268.

The prosecutor then asked multiple follow-up questions to Moreno about how she understood his questions from the previous day.

[Prosecutor]: Yesterday . . . you used the verb “molestar”. . . . For the record that’s M-O-L-E-S-T-A-R. . . . Correct?

[Moreno]: Yes. That’s so.

. . . .

[Prosecutor]: Okay. And so the interpreter at the time who was interpreting your answers, you used the word “*molestar*,” correct?

[Moreno]: Yes. That’s so.

[Prosecutor]: But then I asked the question, “You were aware”—or something to the effect that you knew that your daughter was saying that [the defendant] had molested your daughter, correct?

[Moreno]: I was not conscious of this because she had not said anything to me, as I will repeat again.

[Prosecutor]: So—but isn’t it correct that the interpreter who was interpreting questions for me did not use the word “*molestar*”? She used “*abuso deshonesto*”—

[Prosecutor]: Which for the record is A-B-U-S-O, “*abuso*,” and “*deshonesto*” is D-E-S-H-O-N-E-S-T-O.

. . . .

[Prosecutor]: When I asked the followup question, I used the word—the word that was translated to you was *abuso deshonesto*, correct?

[Moreno]: My sister never said at any moment that he was being sexually inappropriate or that he had been naked or anything like that.

[Prosecutor]: That's not the question I just asked you; is it, Ms. Moreno Hernandez? Is it?

[Moreno]: But it's the same thing. It's the same thing when you're talking about sexual inappropriateness. And if that's not how I should understand it, explain it to me.

[Prosecutor]: So I'm going to repeat my question. My question is, when I asked the followup question yesterday, the verb that was translated from my question was not *molestar*. It was *abuso deshonesto*, correct?

[Moreno]: Well, I don't remember that you had—if you asked me that question.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. So you don't recall what you testified to yesterday afternoon?

....

[Moreno]: Of course I did.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. So let's move on. Whatever you understood it to mean, you knew that your daughter had called the police, correct?

8 VRP at 1270-74. Later when the prosecutor asked Moreno about a conversation with her brother he returned to using and spelling Spanish.

[Moreno]: I only asked him what had happened. And he said that, yes, that my husband had been bothering, annoying, or pestering her.

[Prosecutor]: You used that verb *molestar* again just now.

[Moreno]: Yes. Because they didn't give me any explanation concerning what it was about.

[Prosecutor]: Okay. So [your brother], when he spoke to you, only told you—only used the verb *molestar* to describe what [RY] had said about what [the defendant] had done to her.

[Moreno]: Yes. That's so.

[Prosecutor]: Just like you're saying that [your sister] only used the word *molestar*, correct?

[Moreno]: Yes.

....

[Prosecutor]: Sure. My question is, when you say that [your brother] used the word *molestar*, is it your understanding [your brother] observed the report that [RY] made to the police?

[Moreno]: Yes. That's so.

[Prosecutor]: If we're talking about someone taking down the pants of a 14-year-old girl and forcibly rubbing their penis between their leg, would you call that *molestar*, M-O-L-E-S-T-A-R?

[Moreno]: I didn't know anything about that.

[Prosecutor]: That's not my question; is it? My question is, that situation I described, where someone forcibly removes the pants of a 14-year-old girl and rubs their penis between her legs, would you use the word *molestar*, M-O-L-E-S-T-A-R, to describe that action?

[Moreno]: No. It's different.

[Prosecutor]: Right. That's *abuso deshonesto*—A-B-U-S-O D-E-S-H-O-N-E-S-T-O -- isn't it?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection.

8 VRP at 1286-87. The prosecutor then changed topics despite the court overruling the objection. Moreno did not have the opportunity to answer.⁴

ANALYSIS

I would conclude that the prosecutor's questioning was improper.

As a witness, Moreno was hostile to the State and the prosecutor had reason to encourage the jury to disbelieve her testimony. While the prosecutor was certainly entitled to point out inconsistencies in Moreno's testimony and to call her credibility into question, I am troubled by

⁴ The prosecutor also questioned Moreno about her daughter's journey to the United States, emphasizing repeatedly that she had arranged for "a coyote to bring [RY] up . . . from El Salvador to Texas," incorrectly alleging that Moreno was trying to deny that fact. 7 VRP at 1235 Moreno did not deny paying someone to get RY to Texas. Defense counsel objected three times and was overruled each time. It is unclear what probative value the circumstances of RY's immigration would have had in this trial. But the defendant did not assign error or allege prosecutorial misconduct with regard to this line of questioning.

the prosecutor's questions described above for two reasons. First the prosecutor relied on his imperfect recollection of Moreno's prior testimony and his understanding of the proper translation of the Spanish words rather than using a transcript of the precise prior testimony or calling the interpreter to explain the translation. Second, the way the prosecutor handled the exchange appeared designed to appeal to the passions or prejudices of the jury and focus on Moreno's ethnicity, potentially appealing to unconscious bias.

A prosecutor must zealously pursue justice but that pursuit is not without boundaries. *State v. Case*, 49 Wn.2d 66, 70-71, 298 P.2d 500 (1956). Prosecutors have a duty to the defendant to ensure their rights to a fair trial are upheld. *State v. Monday*, 171 Wn.2d 667, 676, 257 P.3d 551 (2011). Prosecutors "[w]ith the power of the state at their disposal" must always remember "that a fearless, impartial discharge of public duty, accompanied by a spirit of fairness toward the accused, is the highest commendation they can hope for." *State v. Ollivier*, 178 Wn.2d 813, 860, 312 P.3d 1 (2013) (quoting *State v. Warren*, 165 Wn.2d 17, 27-28, 195 P.3d 940 (2008)).

Prosecutors commit misconduct when they use arguments designed to arouse the passions or prejudices of the jury. *In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). Such arguments create a danger that the jury may convict for reasons other than the evidence. See *State v. Ramos*, 164 Wn. App. 327, 338, 263 P.3d 1268 (2011), *as amended* (Feb. 27, 2012).

Rather than relying on the interpreter's explanation of the nuances of the Spanish translation of the words "molestar" and "abuso dishonesto," or calling the interpreter to testify about the previous day's translation, or using the transcript, the prosecutor engaged in a long examination of the witness based on his recollection of what was said and his understanding of

the meanings of the Spanish words. In doing so, he more than once spelled “m-o-l-e-s-t-a-r” and “a-b-u-s-o d-i-s-h-o-n-e-s-t-o.”

The interpreter made it perfectly clear to the jury that the Spanish word “molestar” had been misinterpreted the day before. But the prosecutor kept using and emphasizing the word, which carries no sexual connection in Spanish, but an English speaker would very likely find it difficult to set aside a sexual connotation when hearing the word. This exchange, including the spelling of the word “molestar,” is concerning because there appears to be no purpose other than to arouse an emotional response.

In addition, the exchange expressly focused both on the witness’s status as a non-English speaker while simultaneously questioning her understanding of words in her own language. Appealing to a juror’s bias is not always obvious. *Monday*, 171 Wn.2d at 678. “Perhaps more effective but just as insidious are subtle references.” *Id.* Careful placement of words scattered throughout the proceedings can improperly influence the jury “[l]ike wolves in sheep’s clothing.” *Id.*

“Even a reference that is not derogatory may carry impermissible connotations, or may trigger prejudiced responses in the listeners that the speaker might neither have predicted nor intended.” *Id.* at 684 (Madsen, J concurring). ““In cases where race should be irrelevant, racial considerations, in particular, can affect a juror’s impartiality and must be removed from courtroom proceedings to the fullest extent possible.”” *Id.* (quoting *State v. Varner*, 643 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. 2002)). A prosecutor should never appeal to racial biases to achieve convictions. *Monday*, 171 Wn.2d at 676.

Here the prosecutor’s extended and unusual exchange with this witness could have appealed to the jury’s unconscious bias. It focused the jury’s attention on Moreno’s ethnicity

and immigration status, and questioned her understanding of words in her own language.⁵ It is difficult for us, when reading a cold record, to gauge the impact that this focus on ethnicity and immigration status might have had on the jury. But even subtle focus that could improperly invite unconscious bias to impact the jury's view of a witness's credibility should be studiously avoided, especially by prosecutors.

Even so, although the prosecutor's questioning of Moreno was improper, I agree with the majority that it was not prejudicial. Generally, improper conduct is considered prejudicial if "there is a substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's verdict." *State v. Yates*, 161 Wn.2d 714, 774, 168 P.3d 359 (2007) (quoting *State v. Brown*, 132 Wn.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). Here, I find no substantial likelihood the questioning ultimately affected the jury's verdict for three reasons.

First, despite the prosecutor's muddying of the waters, the interpreter's correction was clear and concise in telling the jury that a misinterpretation occurred and what it was.

Second, Moreno was firm and clear in her answers throughout this line of questioning. She continued to clearly state that the word she used did not have a sexual meaning, she never intended her answer to have a sexual meaning, and she never understood another's use of "molestar" to have a sexual meaning.


Finally, after the prosecutor's questioning, the trial court offered Moreno-Hernandez the opportunity to call the interpreter again to clarify any confusion that might have been created. The defense declined this opportunity. Had the defense believed there was still potential for jury confusion, it could have called the interpreter, but did not find it necessary to do so.

⁵ This is even more troubling when considering that the prosecutor also separately focused on the immigration status of the witnesses and the nature of the arrangements that Moreno made to bring her daughter to this country.

With regard to the potential appeal to unconscious racial bias, the questioning here does not rise to the level of impropriety that occurred in *Monday*, 171 Wn.2d 667. There, the prosecutor expressly argued that the defense witnesses should be discounted because “the code is black folk don’t testify against black folk. You don’t snitch to the police.” *Id.* at 674. While I am troubled by the prosecutor’s emphases in questioning Moreno in this case, I do not conclude that questioning her is comparable to the misconduct that occurred in *Monday*.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I agree with the majority that the conviction should be affirmed. Nevertheless, prosecutors, especially, should take care to avoid appeals to bias like those that occurred in this case, even subtle ones.


Glasgow, J.

APPENDIX B

August 19, 2019

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JOSE R. MORENO-HERNANDEZ,

Appellant.

No. 50826-5-II


ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Appellant, Jose R. Moreno-Hernandez, moves this court to reconsideration it July 9, 2019 opinion. After consideration, we deny the motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Panel: Jj. Melnick, Sutton, Glasgow.

FOR THE COURT:



Presiding Judge

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Court of Appeals
Division II
State of Washington
7/29/2019 4:43 PM
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION TWO

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	No. 50826-5-II
Respondent,)	
)	MOTION TO
v.)	RECONSIDER
)	
JOSE MORENO-HERNANDEZ,)	
Appellant.)	

I. IDENTITY OF MOVING PARTY AND RELIEF SOUGHT

So that the ends of justice might be served and pursuant to RAP 12.4, Jose Moreno-Hernandez asks the Court to reconsider its decision dated July 9, 2019. A copy of the decision is attached as Appendix A.

II. GROUND FOR RELIEF AND ARGUMENT

Two justices of this Court determined that the prosecutor's insertion of his own belief and memory when questioning his witness about her previous testimony in a different language was not misconduct. Slip op. at 7. Mr. Moreno-Hernandez seeks reconsideration of this decision that fails to account for the prosecutor's insistence on this prejudicial mistranslation well after the interpreter's unambiguous correction.

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez also seeks reconsideration of the concurring opinion finding that though the prosecutor committed misconduct, it was harmless error. Slip op. at 25.

Finally, Mr. Moreno-Hernandez asks this Court to reconsider its refusal to rule on Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's hearsay objection raised below and on appeal because this Court misconstrued Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's discussion of the court's erroneous basis for admission of this hearsay evidence as a "different ground than his objection at trial." Slip op. at 14; Brief of Appellant at 31-35.

a. The prosecution insisted that Ms. Moreno learned her daughter was "molested" by Mr. Moreno-Hernandez well after the interpreter clarified that was a mistranslation, including in closing argument.

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's wife's daughter accused him of attempted rape. CP 3. Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's wife, Nelbis Moreno, testified that the evening her daughter reported this to police, she received a call from her sister letting her know that Mr. Moreno-Hernandez was pestering or annoying her daughter. RP 1269. The interpreter mistranslated the meaning of pestering or annoying, as "molesting" in English. RP 1261. The interpreter corrected the mistranslation the following day. RP 1260-61; 1268. Immediately after this correction, the prosecutor continued to assert the mistranslation of "molestar," with the erroneous sexual connotation based on his own memory of how his questions had been translated to Ms. Moreno the previous day. RP 1270-73, 1277, 1286-1287; Slip op. at 5-6.

This Court's majority decision endorses the State's disingenuous claim that the prosecutor was seeking "clarification" by inserting a highly

prejudicial mistranslation of the word “molest” which was corrected by the interpreter. Slip op. at 9. This Court fails to properly consider the import of the prosecutor repeating this prejudicial misstatement *after* it was corrected by the interpreter and in *closing argument*, well after the witness and interpreter tried to correct this prejudicial insistence on the mistranslation. RP 1510; Slip op. at 7-11.

The prosecutor’s insistence on the prejudicial mistranslation to undermine the defendant’s wife and bolster her daughter’s claim cannot be construed as mere “clarification,” where the prosecutor argued this mistranslation in closing argument:

Meanwhile, across town, Nelbis Moreno-Hernandez had learned that something -- her daughter had alleged that the defendant had molested her, and she did nothing.

RP 1510.

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez seeks reconsideration of this Court’s decision that ignores the prosecutor’s willful insistence on his own recollection of testimony in a foreign language that impermissibly turned him into an advocate, introduced extrinsic (false) evidence, and usurped the role of the interpreter in a way that appealed to the jury’s unconscious bias.

b. This Court did not properly consider how the prosecutor's assertion of his own memory and interpretation of the witness's testimony in a foreign language made him an advocate who discredited his own witness based on extrinsic evidence.

This Court minimizes the prosecutor entering the fray as a witness and advocate in finding that ultimately, the prosecutor's line of questioning clarified that "Moreno did not learn that the abuse was sexual in nature in light of the incident." Slip op. at 11. This highlights exactly the problem with the prosecutor interjecting his own belief about the truth of her testimony. It is clear from the prosecutor's argumentative assertion that Ms. Moreno said something different the previous day, that the prosecutor believed that her testimony was either inaccurate or false, *based on his own recollection belief about what she said*. Though Ms. Moreno insisted on the correct version, it is clear from the questioning that the prosecutor disagreed and did not believe her.

This turned the prosecutor into a witness introducing evidence, in violation of the witness-advocate rule, based on extrinsic evidence, which also pitted the prestige of the prosecutor against his own witness. By the end of this extended questioning, the jury had no doubt that the prosecutor personally believed, through insisting on his own memory of events, that they should discredit Ms. Moreno's disbelief in her daughter's accusations, because as argued by the prosecutor in closing, he believed that Ms. Moreno's daughter told her she was molested and she did nothing. RP 1510.

This Court rejected Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's claim that the prosecutor's interjection of his own understanding of the Spanish language when questioning his own witnesses was not extrinsic evidence because "Moreno-Hernandez bases his argument on cases where prosecutors argued, *in closing*, evidence outside the record." Slip op. at 10. This ignores, as noted above, that the prosecutor did in fact introduce falsely posited notion that the defendant's wife learned her daughter was sexually abused in closing argument. RP 1510.

This closing argument was a blatant misstatement of the mistranslation that the prosecutor sought to introduce during direct examination of Ms. Moreno, which, contrary to this Court's conclusion, means the prosecutor submitted extrinsic evidence to the jury in closing argument that was false, which is misconduct. *See e.g. State v. Vassar*, 188 Wn. App. 251, 259, 352 P.3d 856 (2015); Slip op. at 10.

This Court should reconsider its decision and find, like the concurring the opinion, that the prosecutor's questioning and closing argument that insisted on a prejudicial mistranslation was misconduct. Slip op. at 22.

c. The prosecutor's questioning based on his memory of Ms. Moreno's prior testimony in a foreign language conveyed the prosecutor's disdain and disbelief of her testimony, which is not harmless error, especially where the prosecutor explicitly vouched for the complaining witness.

This Court should reconsider its decision that finds that any error was harmless. Slip op. at 11 and 25. Even if Ms. Moreno was able to testify that she in fact did not learn "the abuse was sexual in nature the night of the incident," the prosecutor's questioning left no ambiguity about his disbelief and disdain for his own witness, and by extension, Mr. Moreno-Hernandez. Slip op. at 11 and 25.

This Court's decision allows the prosecutor to ignore his duty to act as "quasi-judicial officer and to "represent the people and presumptively act with impartiality in the interest of justice," with an obligation to "subdue courtroom zeal for the sake of fairness to the defendant." *State v. Thierry*, 190 Wn. App. 680, 689, 360 P.3d 940 (2015) (citing *State v. Thorgeron*, 172 Wn.2d 438, 443, 258 P.3d 43 (2011)).

This misconduct was most certainly prejudicial, because through this questioning, the prosecutor posited his personal belief, based on evidence outside of the record, that the prosecutor believed the defendant's wife knew her daughter was sexually abused and did nothing. Such a statement of personal belief would necessarily be prejudicial where the State charged Mr.

Moreno-Hernandez with attempted rape based solely on the testimony of Ms. Moreno's daughter, who her own mother did not believe.

In analyzing prejudice, this Court should have considered even the errors that were not objected to, such as when the prosecutor made a record in open court about the credibility and consistency of the complaining witness's testimony. Slip op. at 12. On appeal, the State concedes this was error, but this Court determined that since it was not objected to, it was "waived." Slip op. at 12. However, to determine whether misconduct that was not objected to was so flagrant and ill intentioned that it could not have been cured by an instruction, "[t]he criterion always is, has such a feeling of prejudice been engendered or located in the minds of the jury as to prevent a [defendant] from having a fair trial?" *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 762, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). The prosecutor's blatant personal vouching for his witness, which the State concedes was error, does not simply get removed from the prejudice analysis because it was not objected to. To the contrary, this Court should factor this additional misconduct in light of the objected to misconduct in which the prosecutor continually inserted himself as a witness and advocate at trial in considering whether this so prejudiced the jury against the defendant that no instruction could have cured it.

This Court should reconsider its opinion and find the numerous instances of the prosecutor inserting himself as advocate for his own

witness, usurping the role of the expert interpreter to introduce extrinsic evidence of his own purported knowledge of the Spanish language was prejudicial misconduct that entitles Mr. Moreno-Hernandez to a new trial.

2. This Court's refusal to consider Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's hearsay objection that was raised below and on appeal is based on the Court misconstruing Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's analysis of the authority that supports the hearsay objection raised below as a different grounds than his objection at trial. This is error meriting reconsideration.

This Court refused to consider Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's objection to the hearsay evidence raised below and on appeal, erroneously interpreting Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's analysis of the trial court's basis for admission on appeal as a new grounds for litigating the issue. Slip op at 14.

This Court's opinion recognizes that "at trial," Mr. Moreno-Hernandez sought to prohibit the complaining witness from testifying about her mother's and aunt's hearsay statements. Slip op at 14. This is the precise issue argued by Mr. Moreno-Hernandez on appeal in argument two, which argued that the court erred in admitting hearsay that served no relevant purpose. Brief of Appellant at 31; RP 840-41. The discussion of relevance was not a new issue before the court, but rather an analysis of why the court's basis for allowing the hearsay testimony: "effect on listener," was not a valid basis for admission. RP 840; Brief of Appellant at 31.

As argued on appeal, this basis for the admission of hearsay evidence only applies when the out-of-court declarations are relevant to an


issue in controversy. Brief of Appellant at 32 (citing *State v. Edwards*, 131 Wn. App. 611, 614, 128 P.3d 631 (2006)). On appeal, Mr. Moreno-Hernandez argued that the court's basis for the admission of hearsay evidence was not valid, because the complaining witness's state of mind after reporting her allegations to police was not at issue. Brief of Appellant at 33-34. This made the trial court's admission of this hearsay evidence inapplicable, and error. This was by no means an appeal on different grounds than objected to at trial as found by this Court. Slip op. at 14. It was an explanation of why the trial court erred. Brief of Appellant at 31-36.

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez seeks reconsideration of this properly preserved objection to the admission of hearsay raised below and on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

Mr. Moreno-Hernandez seeks reconsideration of this Court's decision that failed to consider the breadth of the prosecutor's misconduct at trial, and the harm of a prosecutor inserting himself as an advocate and witness through insisting on highly prejudicial (false) extrinsic evidence based on his memory and belief. Mr. Moreno-Hernandez also seeks reconsideration of this Court's misinterpretation of Mr. Moreno-Hernandez's discussion of the trial court's erroneous basis for admission of hearsay evidence as a different argument on appeal than the hearsay objection raised below.

Respectfully submitted this 29th day of July 2019.



KATE BENWARD-WSBA 43651
Washington Appellate Project – 91052
Attorney for Respondent

DECLARATION OF FILING AND MAILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the below date, the original document **Petition for Review to the Supreme Court** to which this declaration is affixed/attached, was filed in the **Court of Appeals** under **Case No. 50826-5-II**, and a true copy was mailed with first-class postage prepaid or otherwise caused to be delivered to the following attorney(s) or party/parties of record at their regular office / residence / e-mail address as listed on ACORDS / WSBA website:

- respondent Maureen Goodman, DPA
[PCpatcecf@co.pierce.wa.us][maureen.goodman@piercecountywa.gov]
Pierce County Prosecutor's Office
- petitioner
- Attorney for other party



MARIA ANA ARRANZA RILEY, Legal Assistant
Washington Appellate Project

Date: September 18, 2019

WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT

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Transmittal Information

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